Abstract

This paper shows how Martin Heidegger revolutionized epistemology

by reflecting on the meaning of objects, coming to the conclusion

that persons are not objects and objects do not have an existence

independent from thinking. His critique of Western epistemology is

analyzed, and a draft proposal is presented reconciling the classical

subject-object distinction and Heidegger’s hermeneutics.

 

 

1 Introduction

What is the meaning of existence? This is a very old philosophical

question, although not the foundational one. Starting with Thales,

Ancient Greek philosophers asked the question of the origin of all

things: Where does everything come from? When Aristotle established

his theory of causality, he distinguished four different causes,

one of them being the final cause (telos): the purpose of something

for someone. But how does this cause fit in a world view dominated

by material and efficient causes? Edmund Husserl established the

method of eidetic reduction, trying to reveal the structure of pure consciousness.

Martin Heidegger objects that this project is untenable,

because pure consciousness does not exist. Whereas Husserl argued

that intentionality is essentially related to consciousness, Heidegger

said that there is no intentionality without meaning, and since meaning

is created by consciousness, there can be no consciousness without

any pre-understanding.

 

2 Meaning in Being and Time

2.1 The structure of Dasein

Because Heidegger does not want to be connected to the dualistic

tradition of subject-object distinction, he introduces the term Dasein

which he used instead of the term ‘subject’. A Dasein is basically an

entity that is conscious of its own existence. (BT 32) “Dasein always

understands itself in terms of its existence - in terms of a possibility of

itself: to be itself or not itself.” (BT 33) It is quite different to analyze

the ontological structure of things and Dasein itself. When analyzing

things we differentiate according to certain categories, as we do in an

Aristotelian or Kantian tradition. (BT 70) According to Heidegger,

analyzing Dasein is different: Since understanding takes place within

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Dasein, understanding Dasein is formal (without content). The structure

of Dasein must be defined in “terms of existentiality” (BT 70),

meaning the states of Being that are necessary for the Dasein to exist.

Understanding takes place within our consciousness. At the same

time understanding constitutes consciousness, because consciousness

without understanding is “empty”: Heidegger’s teacher Edmund Husserl

thought that consciousness is always intentional, it needs to create

‘objects of thinking’ which are put into a meaningful relation, finally

constituting an act of thinking. In Chapter 31 of Being and Time

Martin Heidegger writes: “If we interpret understanding as a fundamental

existentiale, this indicates that this phenomenon is conceived

as a basic mode of Dasein’s being.” (BT 182 / OS 115). Existentialia

(pl. of existentiale) are certain characteristics of the structure

of Dasein, which are necessary to constitute Dasein.

Heidegger introduces the concept of “ontological difference” by

equating Sein (which is described as the horizon of understanding)

and understanding: Only what is understandable can actually exist.

Sein is the precondition to Seiend, because things can only be perceived

as beings (recognized that they are) by understanding them

(recognized how they are). Sein and Seiendes are identical in difference.

This difference is also reflected in the distinction of the understanding

(Dasein) and the thing(s) to be understood. Trying to

understand oneself, a person usually projects the comprehension of

the world’s Sein to himself, which makes him belief that he is himself

a thing, which Heidegger rejects: Humans only exist in performing

their life (Lebensvollzug).

Now Heidegger’s definition of the Sein of the Dasein (“the totality

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of Dasein’s structural whole.”, BT 317) shall be analyzed: “Ahead-ofoneself-

being-already-in as being-alongside.”1 This rather incomprehensible

summary covers very important points:

1) “Sich vorweg sein” (being ahead of oneself) displays Heidegger’s

concept of existentiality: One has a pre-understanding of the world;

the Dasein has a pre-understanding of Sein in order to be able to ask

the question of Sein.

2) “Schon sein in” (being already in) displays Heidegger’s concept

of facticity or thrownness. The Dasein is thrown into Dasein and does

not find any reason for this having happened or for anything to exist.

3) “Sein bei” (being with) displays Heidegger’s concept of Verfallenheit.

Because of its thrownness into the world, the Dasein is

mainly determined by the Man, which is the cultural, historical and

social background of Dasein.

2.2 Meaning and Understanding

Essential characteristics of the structure of Dasein are defined as existentialia.

These do not only include the possibility of intentionality,

as Husserl pointed out, but meanings as defined relations of intentional

objects. Not all relations can be created by the Dasein. Its

“thrownness” into reality implies that it has a pre-understanding of

some meanings, at least those which are sufficient to be self-aware:

“Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentialityfor-

Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself

1“Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in (einer Welt) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegenenden

Seienden)”

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what its Being is capable of.” (BT 184 / OS 117)

When we ‘create’ an object in our consciousness, we establish the

idea of this object as being part of a ‘web of involvements’. We project

possible uses and origins into this idea, making the object related

to previous objects we know. This is also true for our own Dasein,

when we try to understand it: we try too see it in the totality of its

involvements: “As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself

and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities.” (BT 185 /

OS 118)

We see here that Heidegger’s method is similar to the one of

Descartes and Kant. Descartes tried to establish criteria for absolute

knowledge, starting from ‘I think’, coming to the conclusion that

the only thing I can know for sure - when I doubt everything that is

doubtable - I cannot deny that I as a thinking entity (res cogitans) exist.

Kant builds his theory on this undoubtable knowledge, extending

it by the structures of intuition which transform sensual into conceptual

perception (categories). Heidegger basically denies that this ‘a

priori’ knowledge is enough to establish self-awareness. The Cartesian

idea, that the ‘I’ is conscious of its own process of doubting, is very

similar to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein: an entity that is aware of

its own existence. But this awareness is not - as Descartes claims -

without any presupposition. Making the statement ‘I think therefore

I am’, one already has concepts of ‘I’, ‘thinking’, ‘existence’ and a

concept of logical implication. And this makes Heidegger’s concept

of Dasein even more primordial, yet at the same time not foundational:

His philosophy accepts that any form of knowledge needs some

pre-understanding, and we cannot go back to one basic concept upon

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which everything is based. According to Heidegger, even the phenomenological

“intuition of essences” - as developed by Husserl - are

grounded on existential understanding (C.f. OS 119).

2.3 Fore-structures

Because of the interpreter’s fore-structures (Vorhabe, Vorsicht and

Vorgriff ), meaning cannot exist outside of Dasein. (OS 122) Hence

hermeneutics (understanding something in the world) always requires

investigating the ontological structure of Dasein. This structure “emerges

as Dasein comes to articulate the as-structure of its Being as understanding.”

(OS 17) Including the structure of Dasein, ontological

hermeneutics points out that an entity must be seen “as something in

its totality of involvements”. (OS 18)

When we try to understand a new concept or object, we summarize

all possible interactions it can have with us or with things we have

already understood (our fore-having). For example, when we see a

key without ever having seen either a door or metal, nor ever having

experienced the need for privacy, we would not understand this new

object. We might admire the fine structure of the key and see it as an

object of art. But in the web of involvements of a person in our current

society, the concept of a key is understood quickly. The concept of key

is connected with doors, the feeling of security and privacy, and with

the locksmith that formed metal into this particular form. Having an

origin and a purpose, the concept key extends our web of interrelated

meanings and fits nicely within in.

The question of purpose is much more important than origin. We

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can have a proper concept of ‘key’ even if we don’t know how it is

made; the material out of which it is made is as well irrelevant. What

is important is to assume that an item is made for a certain purpose.

When understanding an object we project our own Dasein into

possible worlds, where the Dasein interacts with this object: “As understanding,

Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities.” (BT 188 /

OS 120) We have a fore-sight of all possible involvements.

Interpretation [Auslegung] is the development of understanding

(OS 120). “In interpretation, understanding (...) becomes itself.”

(BT 188 / OS 121) It is the “working-out of possibilities projected in

understanding” (Ibid.) It is not the case that we simply project all

possible purposes into an object giving it an unambigious meaning,

but the meaning of a concept is always open for change and extension.

The possible involvements do not even have to be coherent: For

example an abstract term (like ‘justice’) can be applied and rejected

at the same time for a certain situation, depending on the concept of

justice (for example a utilitiarian and deontological conception). It

is not an exeptional case but quite normal that a concept comprises

contradictory involvements.

In order to understand concepts we have to fit them in into our

previous web of meanings. When interpreting a text that makes references

to these meanings and puts them in certain relations, we can only

understand these relations by using and reflecting on our fore-having.

“[T]he interpretation operates in Being towards a totality of involvements

which is already understood - a Being which understands.” (BT

191 / OS 122). Interpretation extends our fore-having and creates -

based on the fore-having as groundwork - a more-dimensional web of

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possible extensions. (I further explain this idea in the next chapter

using “models of reality”.)

Heidegger symbolizes this necessity of a fore-structure in order

to understand and interpret something new with the concept of the

hermeneutic circle, which we cannot avoid (There is no presuppositionless

or foundational knowledge) but only learn to “come into it

in the right way”(BT 195 / OS 125). “An interpretation is never a

presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us.” (BT

191f / OS 123)

How does something become intelligible as something? Intelligibility

does not mean knowledge. It means that a connection from

the fore-having to the object can be created; that there are consistent

extensions of the fore-having that include the new object or concept.

The process of this fitting-in is the process of interpretation. “In the

[hermeneutic] circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial

kind of knowing.” (BT 195 / OS 126)

3 The Concept of Reality

3.1 Language

Language is quite often ambiguous, and a very important part of Martin

Heidegger’s philosophical journey is examining some of these ambiguities.

The verb ‘to be’ can be used in various ways in the English

and German language. It can be used as an auxiliary or a main verb,

or it can be substantiated, which is the most problematic action. In

German there are two possibilities for substantiation: every verb can

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be substantiated without making any changes on the verb itself or one

can create a progressive form similar to the English language. The first

possibility is usually equal to the progressive form in English: If one

literally says “the go” (“Das Gehen”) in German, one means the process

of going - but usually in a very abstract sense, not one particular

act of going. A substantiated verb ‘to be’, in German ‘Sein’, can be

translated ‘being’ or ‘existence’. But what is actually referred to? For

this particular verb, the meaning is usually not equivalent to the progressive

form. ‘Das Sein’ can have two meanings: Either it stands for

the individual existence of a person (my or your being), or it can refer

to the world / universe as a whole.

The second option - referring to the universe as a whole - is shown

by Heidegger to be unsatisfactory. The question is whether mental

entities, such as my individual existence, are a part of the world as

a whole. This is also where Heidegger modifies Husserl’s phenomenological

method: The world does not stand in contrast to the subject,

but the subject is a part of the world. Heidegger’s objective is to

reconcile the ideas that the world is constituted by the experiencing

person AND the experiencing person is a part of the world.

3.2 Properties and Concepts

Reality is considered to be everything there is. The universe is considered

to be equivalent either to reality or to the observable part of

reality.2 Everybody has a concept of ‘existence’ and everyone is able

2Some people say there is a ‘multiverse’ consisting of different universes. Others say

that there is a platonic world or there is a God which/who is existent but outside of the

universe. Let’s assume here that the word reality also includes all possible extensions.

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to count. We cannot count everything there is, but we usually think,

if we had enough time, we might be able to do so. That is because

we suppose OBJ: “The universe consists of objects”3 and FIN: “The

amount of objects in the universe is finite.” But actually these premises

are disputable and, moreover, there is not just one universe: Every

universe we think of is a concept in our mind. And we can think

of different kinds of universes: finite or infinite, Euclidean or non-

Euclidean, grainy or continuous. Universes are therefore embedded as

modal objects within our inner intuitive space. We only assume (OR)

that there is one single universe “out there” that matches - completely,

partly, or maybe not at all - one of our models.

Why do we think the universe consists of objects? This might be

because objects are the basic elements of mental perception. Sensory

perception, on the contrary, is a wholeness which out of itself does

not bring about cognition. Cognition starts by making distinctions.

A certain part of the sensory input is “cut out” in order to establish

an object of thinking. This act of identification is the very first step

of rationality. An image of the chosen part of the outer perception

is mirrored into our inner perception and is given the predicate “existent”.

The criteria according to which a certain part is chosen are

usually established by a perceived difference. There are certain sensory

inputs that are not in cognition, but rather irreducible feelings

that call for action: hunger, pain, sexual desire. Most properties are

in relation to these basic concepts. At the same time this foundation

gives a structure to the set of relations; it gives them a “meaning”.

One can also call this the universe, as the etymology unversus=whole implies.

3In the word reality the origin ‘res’ (=thing) suggests OBJ.

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In our mind there is an inner perception consisting of possible

models of reality again consisting of objects which are determined

using properties, with the law of non-contradiction as method and

prerequisite.

What is not clear thus far is the process that determines a certain

part of the sensory input to be an object of perception. How can a

baby recognize a milk bottle as a milk bottle? Why can’t it recognize

a watch as a watch? The answer is easy: the milk bottle is a

part of the baby’s life-world (Lebenswelt - as introduced by Edmund

Husserl), for thinking always has its roots within life.4 According

to Heidegger, no object can have an independent existence, without

any meaningful relations. Objects of perception are constituted by

establishing or discovering references to one’s own life and to prior

meaningful objects; they are things in space and time, which means

they have an appearance, a history and a future. The history correlates

to the question “where does it come from?” and the future to

“what is its purpose?”, the latter being the more important. A milk

bottle is identified as a milk bottle only after seeing it as “something

that looks like the image of a milk bottle that I have in my head and

something that has the purpose to still my hunger”. Heidegger points

out that not every concept can be established using this method, since

there are always fundamental concepts that cannot be further defined.

In this example, ‘hunger’ is such a concept. Contrary to Kant’s view,

this interpretation horizon (“Verst¨andnishorizont”) is not only for-

4Wilhelm Dilthey actually stated that thinking can never go beyond life. Here I remain

with a weaker version. C.f. Dilthey, GS XIX, S. 346f.

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mal5 but already ‘contains’ meaning (c.f. Chapter 2). For Heidegger,

ontological questions begin here, not by splitting the world up into

independent objects as in the Aristotelian approach.

Where does this rather relativistic approach of objects lead us?

We would have to rethink the premise OBJ stating that the world

consists of objects or modify our concepts of world and reality. OBJ

can be maintained by reducing the set of existing objects to possible

fundamental physical particles. This would leave all objects of

perception to be simple agglomerations of particles and would not explain

why certain agglomerations can be given a meaning and others

cannot.6 Rather, the concept world can be comprehended as a meaningful

totality (“sinnhafte Totalit¨at”). The world therefore contains

all possible objects of perception and all possible meaningful relations

between these objects, and hence, can never be perceived completely.

It exists prior to setting up any relations; it is the precondition for the

possibility of experience; it is transcendental.

3.3 The Ontological Dimension of Being

The theses hitherto are somewhat disturbing: Universes are theoretically

in our mind, yet the world and its objects exist prior to human

experience. However, it is important to emphasize that the subject

finds itself to be a part of this meaningful totality; it recognizes that

not all meanings are simply established but some are indeed discov-

5According to Kant, certain categories and the understanding of time and space are a

priori (before experience), all objects of perception are a posteriori.

6For example, the agglomeration “the moon and my shoes” is not considered an object

of perception; not even cohesive agglomerations like “the right half of my body”.

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ered. Therefore, the subject assumes that the meaningful totality is

unique as well as consistent. Inconsistencies in our thinking can indeed

only be determined by applying them to an independent and

supposedly consistent reality; several models of reality within our inner

perception are incoherent only if there is just one reality.

Hence the assumption of one consistent objective reality is strongly

connected to the process of thinking. Our actions are usually determined

using one of our models of reality in order to predict and achieve

a certain outcome. In a decision process we may sometimes use more

than one model, for example with the goal of minimizing risks. But we

consistently make the assumtion that some worlds are better models

of reality than others. The idea of reality is ‘constructed’ as a limit

of infinitely improving models. But how would one model be determined

better than a different one? The main criteria are consistency,

coherency and parsimony. Coherency usually means a compliance of

implications of the model and sensory inputs. According to Poppers

falsificationism, a theory is valid as long as it is not disproved by

experiment. The problem with the criterion of coherency is, what

Hilary Putnam and others noted, that any reference to an object is

theory-dependent and, as Quine pointed out, that particular sentences

can never be verified or falsified in isolation, since every theory can

be modified to comply with unpredicted sensory data (Duhem-Quine-

Thesis). The principle of parsimony as a ground rule of rationality

states that - out of two incoherent but consistent theories both having

equal strength of explanation and prediction - it is rational to accept

the one with less ontological assumptions and irrational to accept the

other. Accepting a theory usually means making it the foundation of

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every-day decisions.

The claim that there is a objective world independent from our

mind is usually referred to as realism. I tried to explain why realism

needs to be accepted in order to be able to make reasonable decisions.

Anti-realism on the other hand does not necessarily reject that there is

an objective reality but rather implies that the set of possible models

cannot be ordered according to the quality of compliance to the real

world.

3.4 Knowledge

Realism and Conceptual Constructivism seem to be mutually exclusive.

Heidegger tells us that concepts can only be understood if they

fit into a totality of previously known meanings. Most of the concepts

are related to purposes and based on their indirect relation to fundamental

existential experiences. Is the fact that these fundamental

experiences are the same for all of humanity the main reason that

we can understand one another? Is knowledge just that submodel of

reality on which there are no disagreements because of the common

existential structure of all Dasein?

I would like to propose a thought experiment. Assuming there is

a Dasein that is not only aware of its own existence but also has a

fore-having that includes the maximality of possible extensions of the

basic human fore-having; the world would be held in this absolute Dasein,

similar to the metaphysical concept of Objective Idealism, as for

instance opined by George Berkeley or Georg W.F. Hegel. The difference

from classical definitions of ‘world’ to this thought experiment is

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that here ‘world’ is not a consistent concept. It includes all possible

consistent models of the world, but these models can be contradictory

towards one another.

It is quite interesting to compare this idea to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s

definition of ‘world’. In his Tractatus Logico-philosophicus he

wrote that the world is the “totality of facts, not of things” (TLP

1.1); a fact is the existence of states of affairs; a logical picture of facts

is a thought, and a thought is a proposition with a sense (meaning)

(TLP 2-4). Especially Wittgenstein’s claim that “the facts in logical

space are the world” (TLP 1.13) can be interpretated as the world

being the universe of all possible facts. Since facts are thoughts and

thoughts are meaningful propositions, the world then is the universe

of all possible consistent systems of interrelated propositions.

Here the limits of a relativism (pluralism) of meanings are clearly

demonstrated. The debate on the question of philosophical relativism

of meanings (which is a view many people like to conclude from

hermeneutics) is very much related to the debate on relativism in

the philosophy of mathematics. There, pluralism is mostly rejected,

because even if one can formulate logically contradictory axiomatic

systems (like, for example, Zermelo-Fraenckel set theory with and

without the Continuum Hypothesis), one can establish a system that

contains all logically formulatable axiomatic systems: the universe of

all possible sets.

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4 Conclusion

Heidegger condemns traditional Western epistemology because it usually

leads to a reductionistic ontology: “Only as phenomonelogy, is ontology

possible” (BT 60). Knowledge is therefore not achieved through

deduction from general and formal laws (as it is in natural sciences),

but is grounded in the understanding of Being.

The problem this method faces is that it shifts knowledge away

from objectivity. Martin Heidegger makes the destinction between

objective existence (‘Vorhandenheit’) and subjective present-at-hand

existence (‘Zuhandenheit’). It is hard to reconcile Heidegger’s epistemology

which is based on Dasein with non-idealist claims, namely

that there are certain facts (like the energetic state of a molecule) even

without any person seeing or knowing it. Some empirical facts have

a truth value even if it is logically impossible to determine this truth

value, as in the statement “The number of galaxies in the universe is

even.” Also mathematical knowledge seems to be independent from

human thinking: G¨odel’s Incompleteness Theorems imply a form of

mathematical platonism.7

As I already postulated in my thought experiment, I think the

only way to reconcile Heidegger’s epistemology with realism is exactly

the way George Berkeley reconciled his subjective idealism with the

idea of a material world that is independent from the human mind.

Berkeley’s objective-subjective idealsm was nicely summarized in a

limerick by Ronald Know and an anonymous reply:8

7C.f. G¨odel 1995, 147.

8Knowles 1999, 442.

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There once was a man who said “God

Must think it exceedingly odd

If he finds that this tree

Continues to be

When there’s no one about in the quad.”

Dear Sir, Your astonishment’s odd

I am always about in the quad

And that’s why the tree

Will continue to be

Since observed by

Yours faithfully,

God.

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Bibliography

Bernstein, Richard: Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Science,

Hermeneutics, and Praxis, Philadelphia 1983.

Gayle, Ormiston / Schrift, Alan (Ed.): The Hermeneutic Tradition.

From Ast to Ricoear, Albany 1990. [GS]

G¨odel, Kurt: Unpublished Philosophical Essays, Basel - Boston - Berlin

1995.

Knowles, Elizabeth: The Oxford Dictionary of quotations, Oxford

1999.

Heidegger, Martin: Being and Time, Malden - Oxford - Victoria 1962.

[BT]

Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Frankfurt 1963.

[TLP]

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